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A Response to Ron Dulek
Jim Suchan
The Naval Postgraduate School
I used to believe in academic truth and beauty, thinking that was all
I needed to know. That was over 30 years ago when I was a graduate stu-
dent at the University of Illinois protected from the politics, plays for
power, and scramble for resources and rewards that often characterize life
in a research university. Back then, literature and film were my “religion”
and academic life, although hectic and demanding, was very good.
FROM INNOCENCE TO EXPERIENCE
After 4 years as a sheltered Illinois graduate student, I landed my first
academic job in the English Department at the University of Arizona.
That’s where I lost my religion and belief in an academic Arcadian world.
After 2 years of being hopelessly naïve about what was important at
Arizona (I was very young, a product of the 1960s, and had a tin ear for
organizational dynamics), my quest for academic truth and beauty took a
back seat to understanding organizational power, politics, and the pub-
lishing games that some faculty played. Not to do so would have been pro-
fessional suicide.
What I was beginning to realize was that universities are not
intellectual utopias but organizations—similar in some respects to business
organizations—composed of complex systems: reward, resource, mea-
surement, and control. Furthermore, those administrators—provosts,
deans, and department chairs—who controlled the system levers had goals
and interests different from mine. In short, it was time I left my Arcadian
world of innocence and figured out who would influence my academic
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career, determine what was actually important to them, and decide if
I wanted to play in the research university sandbox.
But determining what was important turned out to be tricky. I soon
learned there were differences between leadership’s espoused academic
values—scholarship; research; quality instruction; and service to students,
the school, my academic discipline, and the community—and the outputs
that were valued and rewarded—publications in “A-level” journals.
So the vantage point from which I’m responding to Ron’s talk—his two
“goat getters”—is a bit different from his. That vantage point—a Blakean
world of experience—exists from within the complex set of organizational
systems—particularly reward, control, and resource—that characterize
life in a research university. Although my research university life has been
split between English departments and business schools, most of my
examples come from my 27 years of business school experience. I believe,
though, that my experiences are not business school specific; faculty in
other research university disciplines suffer from the same system mis-
alignments I’ll discuss next.
REWARD SYSTEMS’ INFLUENCE
ON FACULTY RESEARCH BEHAVIOR
Clearly, some of Ron’s examples of academic gamesmanship are
unethical—water boarding or other forms of torture are kind treatment to
dissertation advisors who use their power to have their names placed on
papers when they have done little or none of the work. But I’m much more
sympathetic toward academics who play the research “bean counting”
game and, to mix a metaphor, do “salami” research—cut narrow slices
from research data to get as many articles as possible out of their work.
Although I believe I understand what causes this behavior, I still find
myself asking the following questions:
• What causes faculty to see research as a game and to play it the way that
they do?
• Why do fundamentally good people do shady things in an effort to publish?
• Why are we obsessed with rankings and metrics?
• Is there anything we can do to change what Ron calls “metric mania?”
Steve Kerr’s (1975) classic article, “The Folly of Rewarding A and
Hoping for B,” provides a starting point to answers these questions. What
Kerr points out is that whether we’re dealing with hyenas, gazelles, sea
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otters, or people, “most organisms seek information about which activities
are rewarded and then seek to do (or at least pretend to do) those things,
often to the virtual exclusion of activities not rewarded” (p. 769). Kerr’s
concept is simple and uncontroversial. However, research university
reward systems regularly foul up behavior, rewarding activity that they
actually should be discouraging, for example, salami research. That foul-
up occurs when the reward system is not aligned with the quality mea-
surement system and with the research university’s mission: developing
new knowledge that has value, disseminating that knowledge so that it
serves the larger community, and bringing that knowledge back into the
classroom.
So the real problem implicit in Ron’s “goats” is the kind of reward and
quality measurement systems research universities create and their lack of
alignment with their avowed mission and goals. That’s clearly demon-
strated when faculty who publish not only get to teach less but also are
praised, admired, and even envied for having to spend less time in class,
particularly with undergraduates.
These system misalignments can cause faculty to see university work
as a complex game that initially requires them to learn the real rules—
publications (the more the better) in “A-quality” journals are what really
matters—rather than those often espoused by administrators at various
levels: good teaching and good research go hand-in-hand. Playing that
game well may cause faculty to see scholarship through the narrow lens
of refereed journal publications that add lines on their vitae. Even worse,
I’ve seen junior faculty quickly become cynical about research and even
scholarship. So if a job candidate, for example, gets signals that publica-
tions are what really count, it makes perfect sense for him or her to be
insistent on what kind of research is expected, the kinds of places that
research needs to be placed, and some guidance on the approximate num-
ber of articles needed to get tenure. That’s also true of tenured faculty who
want to be promoted to full professor. In short, a job candidate needs to
know the rules of the game before determining if he or she wants to play.
I’d call that due diligence and a rational response to his or her interpreta-
tion of the university reward and measurement systems.
But let’s say you’re still an innocent and your heart is pure—you’re
interested in scholarship, research, teaching, and service—and you don’t
ask tough questions about reward and measurement systems. There’s nothing
worse than accepting a job unaware of the real publishing expectations—
the reward system imperatives—and then finding out that you don’t have
the talent, drive, stamina, and perhaps even the unwavering belief in the
Suchan / RESPONSE TO DULEK 351
value of publishing the number of articles required in the journals seen as
important “hits” to meet the school’s expectations. That lack of awareness
creates a misalignment of people with rewards, and from my experience
that happens far too often. Rather than finding a different place to work,
chances are a number of us will do everything in our power—even
sketchy, unethical things that that make us feel bad about ourselves—to
prove we can play the publishing game. Academics are a proud lot with
healthy egos. It’s hard for us to admit that we don’t have the talent or drive
to play the publishing game well enough to avoid being cut from the team.
Combined with this pride and self-deception is fear—the fear that
we’re not smart, that we don’t measure up to our colleagues who are pub-
lishing in top-level journals, and that we’ll be let go, resulting in “loss of
face” with our colleagues, families, and friends. Fear can make good people
do bad things.
QUALITY AND METRIC MANIA
The larger question is, Why do we have this obsession with number of
articles published, number of times our research is cited, and the ranking
and impact factor of journals? Impact factor, used frequently in Europe
and Asia and increasingly so in the United States to determine article qual-
ity, measures the extent to which articles in one journal are cited in other
journals (Rogers, Campbell, Louhiala-Salminen, Rentz, & Suchan, 2007).
The higher a journal’s impact factor, the greater the journal’s, and pre-
sumably the articles published in that journal, influence on knowledge
generation in that field. This obsession with journal rankings has become
so extreme that a dean of one prominent U.S. business school recognized
and supported only research that appeared on lists of “influential business
journals.”
One reason administrators and faculty rely on simple metrics is that
assessing and making fine distinctions in quality is difficult. That requires
faculty and administrators to carefully read publications, think about
them, debate the publications’ merits, and perhaps learn a bit about some-
one else’s field. In other words, assessing quality requires us to act as
scholars rather than publishers who believe they must carefully manage
their time, not devoting it to activities that aren’t rewarded. Furthermore,
as Ron can attest given his 17 years as a department chair, administrators
are constantly searching for ways to save time because they have so little
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of it. Consequently, it’s much easier to use surrogate measures of quality:
journal rankings, leading journal lists, impact factors, and citations counts.
Also, it’s easier and quicker to judge someone a “good researcher” who
deserves promotion, tenure, summer support, conference funding,
reduced teaching loads, and other rewards. Clear, simple metrics give a
ring of objectivity and scientific truth to those reward decisions, making
them (particularly promotion and tenure) easier to justify to others, par-
ticularly those colleagues in engineering and the physical sciences who
tend to see the world through a quantitative lens.
THE LARGER CULTURAL CONTEXT OF METRIC MANIA
I also believe that there’s a larger cultural academic context, particu-
larly in business schools, that accounts for this focus on counting and met-
rics. Business schools are increasingly being run as businesses. A number
of these schools are attempting to separate themselves financially from
their universities and raise their own resources to fund operations, includ-
ing the purchase of new buildings. As a result of this business strategy,
PhD programs are being scaled back because they lose money.
Undergraduate programs are seen as a nuisance because they don’t gener-
ate significant revenue; consequently, many courses are increasingly
staffed by graduate student assistants (GSAs) and adjunct faculty.
Business school moneymakers—their “cash cows”—are MBA, executive
MBA, executive and management development programs, and alumni.
Significant resources—faculty, marketing, support staff, and facilities—
are devoted to these moneymakers. Most important, the expenditure of
these resources must lead to results.
As every senior private-sector manager realizes, “making the numbers”
each quarter is imperative; otherwise, Wall Street will punish the company.
Business school administrators are increasingly compelled to “make the
numbers.” As one dean told me at a recent AACSB meeting, his job is very
simple: “resources, resources, resources.” The 20 to 25 other deans at the
session strongly agreed. Deans who don’t make the numbers—aren’t suc-
cessful in fundraising through business grants, alumni donations, and
profit-making graduate programs—find themselves looking for new work.
The crucial point is that this metric-driven, objectified, mechanical view of
organizational life seeps into all aspects of business school work. What
Ron calls scholarship—the financial support to read Postman’s The End of
Education, Taleb’s The Black Swan, and even Posnanski’s The Soul of
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Baseball: A Road Trip Through Buck O’Neill’s America—must lead to out-
puts: publications in leading journals. In other words, deans and depart-
ment chairs expect faculty to “make the numbers”—x number of articles
per year every year, low journal acceptance rates, high journal impact fac-
tors, high article citation counts—to demonstrate quality performance and
to justify the resources spent to support them.
Another academic cultural factor that contributes to metric mania is
undergraduate, graduate, and professional school rankings. Each year
BusinessWeek, US News and World Report, Forbes, The Wall Street
Journal, The Financial Times, and a handful of other publications rank
business school undergraduate, MBA, and EMBA programs. These rank-
ings are so important to alumni, current and potential students (particu-
larly for high-priced MBA and EMBA programs), faculty, recruiters,
board of advisors, and university senior leadership that deans are often
rewarded for achieving a higher ranking in a key publication and chastised
or even fired if their rankings slip significantly. In fact, achieving higher
rankings is part of a number of business schools’ strategic plans. I’ve seen
large banners prominently displayed in the lobbies of several business
schools proudly proclaiming that school’s high ranking. And, as expected,
high rankings are part of business schools’ promotional materials. As a
dean of a top-20 ranked MBA program told me, “Alumni giving increases
when Business Week and US News rankings come out and they go up a lot
if our ranking improves. We’re competing for top MBA students; good
rankings help us win students and justify our tuition.” Reputation among
peers is one important factor that determines several key publications’
rankings. Faculty visibility, which is linked to reputation, results from a
steady stream of publications in top journals.
We even see this metric mania in ways AACSB-accredited schools
must demonstrate to this powerful accrediting organization that they are
carefully measuring learning and making changes in their courses and
programs where there are learning gaps. Assessing learning, particularly
higher-level capabilities such as critical thinking, analysis, and synthesis
that are cornerstones of graduate programs, is difficult, time-consuming,
and expensive. Demonstrating learning achievement by assessing through
direct observation the behaviors students have exhibited and the products
they have produced is even more difficult. Many schools don’t have the
resources to do this work well. More important, in research-focused busi-
ness schools, faculty are not rewarded for doing the very hard work
required to demonstrate to AACSB that students have learned.
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To cope with this burden to measure learning, many schools are using
easy-to-collect measures of learning obtained from multiple-choice or fill-
in-the-blank tests and easy-to-quantify grading rubrics. As colleagues at a
number of schools have pointed out, this measurement language is begin-
ning to change the conversation in their schools in disturbing ways. Talk
about instructional measurement—“getting the instructional numbers”—
is crowding out talk about instructional quality and even pedagogical
scholarship.
This focus on business schools operating as a business and thus having
to make their financial numbers, the obsession with business school rank-
ings, and the AACSB drive to measure student learning create an envi-
ronment or climate that reinforces the reduction of scholarship and
research into number of articles published, journal rating systems, and
journal impact factors. Furthermore, reward and measurement systems
reinforce that thinking and behavior. Consequently, I don’t think we
should be surprised if job candidates ask how many articles are needed to
get tenure; if faculty members do “salami” research; if faculty expect,
indeed often demand, to teach less to focus on research; or if faculty make
dubious or unethical decisions to get another line on the resume.
FINAL OBSERVATIONS:
CAN WE CHANGE THESE TRENDS?
I’m not quite sure what we can do to change these trends. However,
I do have several suggestions, although they’re merely speculative. One
obvious alternative is to “retire” to a university that values and rewards
scholarship, research, teaching, and service—the kind of life that Ron
describes in his section on what gives meaning to research. But I believe
that’s a form of avoidance.
Another possibility is to be brave and strong enough to play the game
with integrity and passion so that it ceases to be a game. That takes talent,
stamina, a well-calibrated moral compass, and a strong psyche. After
receiving tenure and, perhaps, being promoted to a full professor, the next
step—and this is the important one—is to actively pursue an administrative
career or, although difficult, one that balances administration, research,
and instruction. The combination of academic credibility and administra-
tive influence provides leverage to alter or recalibrate the reward and con-
trol systems that so heavily influence faculty thinking and behavior. I now
believe that the architects of a university’s systems have extraordinary
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power and leverage to shape academic life in ways faculty often are only
dimly aware of.
Finally, we can help change the talk or narrative in our organizations
about publications and reshape it to discussions about rewarding a blend
of scholarship, research, publication, teaching, and service. Changing
organizational talk is extremely difficult. Determining leverage points or
openings for new language is hard to determine. Also, it’s a challenge to
determine ways to make that different language contagious, to make it
stick. But I believe the challenge is worth pursuing, and it’s work we
should be good at. As Malcolm Gladwell (2000) points out in The Tipping
Point, new language can be contagious, small actions can have big effects,
and change can occur fast. In fact, if I were to step back into my Arcadian
world of innocence where truth and beauty reigned, I might even believe
that our colleagues and even our academic administrators have grown
tired of the research bean-counting game and would welcome a new lan-
guage, a different conversation, and a more growth-inducing set of values
about the work we do.
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